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ARGUMENT 
Like children in a playground, playing a word game, the arguments of counsel for 
the Defendant and counsel for the State can be summarized as saying that the perfunctory 
factual record1 in this case can give rise to two polar opposite conclusions: the Defendant 
saying "no, it does not [support the restitution order]," and the State saying "yes, it does," 
"no, it does not," "yes, it does," "no, it does not," "yes, it does..." and so on. The case 
law identifies three issues the court of appeals must decide in reaching the correct 
resolution in this case. Those issues are whether or not the two short and simple 
hearings— at the time the guilty plea was entered and later at the time the restitution 
order was made—include facts that are clear and complete enough such that: 1) the trial 
court was not required to draw inferences about the crime in ordering the restitution; 2) 
the factual record demonstrates a causal nexus between the facts pled to and the 
restitution ordered; and 3) in making the restitution ordered, the defendant was afforded 
at least the rudimentary predicates of due process. The forgoing three issues are 
essentially tightly interwoven, and are really three different ways of saying the same 
thing: namely, that the factual record is too sparse, and the admissions too attenuated for 
the trier of fact to enter a $60,000 money judgment. As a result, the three factors referred 
1
 Both the plea hearing and the restitution hearing were conducted at the Court's 
regular crowded weekly criminal docket where there were approximately 60 different 
cases appearing on the docket for each respective hearing, and the time allocated for each 
defendant was one or two minutes. 
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to above are not segregated in this reply, but all three are implicit in the arguments made 
in this reply. 
It is Mr. Poulsen's position that somewhere between the entry of the guilty plea to 
participating in a pyramid scheme, and the restitution hearing nearly a year later, there 
was a disconnect—a short circuit, if you will—such that no facts were ever entered into 
the record showing that Mr. Poulsen is factually guilty of causing the loss to the victims 
for which he was ordered to pay restitution. There was a hearing to take his plea, and a 
hearing regarding his financial capacity, but there was never a discussion in between 
about what Mr. Poulsen said or did to the victims that caused them to lose money. 
Without something placed into the record that shows Mr. Poulsen made representations to 
the victims, which induced them to place money into a pyramid scheme, and which 
resulted in them losing money, the three standards referred to above can never be met. 
A neutral and dispassionate review of the short record in this case will reveal that 
there were two hearings. One hearing was limited to taking the plea, the second hearing 
was limited to the Defendant's ability to pay. Lost in between is any semblance of a 
factual predicate for fraud or causation—for how or why the Defendant might owe money 
to the victims. In the plea hearing on May 11, 2010, the Defendant entered his plea, was 
fined $555, and was ordered to perform 60 hours of community service. When the 
subject of restitution was raised briefly, the Defendant's counsel strongly stated to the 
Judge that there was no relationship whatsoever between what was plead to, the amounts 
2 
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lost by the victims, and any nexus of the actions of the Defendant to the losses 
experienced by the victims. Plea Hearing, R. 78. p. 10:4-25. Addendum "A." At the 
restitution hearing nearly one year later, the Court expressly limited the hearing to the 
amount of money the Defendant could pay. Restitution Hearing, R. 79, p. 11: 1-22; p. 4: 
1-25; p. 5 1-25; p. 6 1-19. Addendum "B." The Court actively prohibited any discussion 
of how the victims came to lose their money, what representations, if any, were made by 
the Defendant to the victims, or what the Defendant's relationship was to the victims. Id. 
In short, there are no facts in the record from which causation could be established. This 
latter hearing flew directly in the teeth of Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302 (4), which states 
that: " If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, 
the court shall allow a full hearing on the issue." There was no "full hearing." There 
was at best a three-minute discussion in the midst of a 60-defendant turbo-charged 
criminal docket, in which the Court only permitted evidence of the Defendant's ability to 
pay. 
The State tries to bootstrap this truncated proceeding into an admission that Mr. 
Poulsen caused losses to the victims of $168,000. Yet the record shows just the opposite. 
The State argues, "as a factual basis for the pleas, Defendant admitted that on or about 
March 14th of 2008 and September 26th, 2008, [he] solicited funds for a pyramid scheme, 
the total amount was ...$168,000." Aplee. Br. p. 12. However, such selective cherry 
picking of the record does not tell the whole picture. At the same three minute hearing, 
3 
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the following colloquy took place: 
Ms. O'Bryant: Your honor, we still need to set the restitution-. 
The Judge: Yes. 
Ms. O'Bryant: - and I think its going to probably take the entire twelve months to get 
everything taken care of. 
The Judge: Should we just set a, do you have an number now? 
Ms. O'Bryant: Well, we have the total number of restitution. 1 don't think he has the 
ability to pay that. Ant that's what we wanted to discuss to see if we could come up with 
a stipulation as to court ordered probation. 
The Judge: We'll probably put the order right now. What is the total number? 
Ms. O'Bryant: The total number is $168,400, or-
The Judge: And you agreed to that, so we don 7 need a hearing on that1} 
Mr. Mark Poulsen: No, I don 't agree that that's the proper amount. 
The Judge: Okay. 
Mr. Mark Poulsen: That is the amount various people invested, but he didn't get that or 
any approaching that so a-
The Judge: Well then that's not the amount that he should pay, is that your position. 
Ms. O'Bryant: That's, our position is not that that is the amount— 
The Judge: It's not the judgment-
Ms. O'Bryant -he should have to pay. 
4 
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The Judge: -against him so. 
Ms. O'Bryant: That's the total loss. 
The Judge: Okay. 
Ms. O'Bryant: What we need to discuss is— 
The Judge: How much he owes. Plea Hearing, R. 78. p. 10:4-25. Addendum "A." 
[Emphasis added]. 
The above narrative represents all that was said about the amount the Defendant 
would pay the victims as a result of his plea to participating in a pyramid during his plea 
hearing on May 11, 2010. The court implies that the topic of "how much he owes" would 
occur at the restitution hearing , but it did not. Later, the defendant moved to dismiss the 
restitution hearing, which the judge denied without explanation or comment.2 R. 31, 
Addendum "B." The restitution was held nearly a year later on March 29, 2011. The 
record is significant/or what it does not show more than for what it does show in terms of 
setting forth a factual predicate for alleged bad acts which caused loss to the victims. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Your Honor, may I approach? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
2
 Utah Code Ann§ 77-38a-302(3) states that: "If the court determines that 
restitution is appropriate under this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decisions 
part of the record." The record shows that the court reached the second part of what was 
contemplated by the above statute under sub-part 5(c), namely the ability of the defendant 
to pay restitution. However, it completely ignored sub-part (5)(a) which requires a 
description of the criminal conduct admitted to by the defendant, or the amount to which 
the defendant agreed to pay as part of his plea. 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. MARK POULSEN: I think to be clear, Your Honor, we would stipulate that 
the, the dollar figures that you see there are amounts that victims put into this. 
1,1 reiterate that there has to be a nexus between the allegations pled to, which is 
participating in a pyramid scheme, and the restitution in this case. And 1 don't believe 
that that 168 represents a nexus in any way, shape or form to, to the injury— 
THE JUDGE: That's the argument you made to me that I denied though, isn't it? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I'm not sure if that's, if that's what the basis of your 
denial was, Your Honor. I'm not sure— 
THE JUDGE: That was the basis— 
MR. MARK POULSEN: —if that's what you said. 
THE JUDGE: —of your case though, wasn't it? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: My request was to dismiss the hearing. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I think the court can still have a hearing but still make a 
decision as to the appropriateness of the relationship between the a... 
We DON'T concede though those victims lost that at the hands of this person. 
There's no facts in the record to support that, Your Honor. Any facts would be hearsay to 
that effect. 
We pled very simply to participating in a pyramid scheme. I ask the court in all 
earnest that the restitution order be tied to only those facts. Otherwise we wouldn't have 
6 
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pled to them, Your Honor. 
I would say further, had we known that we were going to be facing $168,000 in 
restitution, 1 would rather take, try the case and have the offense, you know, dealt with in 
a full and fair hearing than plead to participating in a pyramid scheme and still face a 
$168,000 payback. Restitution Hearing, R. 79, p. 4: 18-25; p. 5: 1-25; p. 6: 14. 
Addendum UB." 
Later, the court and counsel had this exchange: 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So lets make sure that you're both a, representing to me the 
standard of review for the court here today. You both stipulate and agree that the real 
purpose of the hearing is to detemiine not the amount of restitution, that been fixed and is 
full and complete at the 168,400. Right? But the order should be based on his ability to 
pay correct? 
MS. O'BRYANT: Yes, Your honor. 
THE JUDGE: Do you agree with that? 
MR. POULSEN: 1 do agree with that. 
THE JUDGE: And what youVe presented to me is the only evidence that I have 
before me to detemiine his ability to pay. Correct? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes. As well as appropriateness. If I could state for the 
record, as well as the appropriateness of the payment in the nexus to the crime is, I 
believe, a proper standard for the court to follow. 
7 
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THE JUDGE: I'm not quite sure. You keep arguing to me and I'm not sure I 
understand it. Because that was before me before and I, I think I denied that, that 
argument that you have made that there should be a restitution that, no restitution in this 
case because it's not appropriate to the crime that he committed. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: And the only thing again I would like to say for the 
record on that point, it's appropriate to have a restitution hearing where both the amount 
of the restitution, or both the ability to pay as well as the circumstances of the restitution 
are appropriate. I think that that is within the scope of a restitution hearing. 
Restitution Hearing, R. 79, p. 10: 11-25; p.l 1: 1-16. Addendum "B." 
There is nothing in either the forgoing plea hearing record or the restitution 
hearing record that can be construed as setting forth a factual predicate for a restitution 
judgment of $60,000. There is no agreement on restitution, and there are express 
objections to the suggestion that the defendants caused injury to the defendants. For all 
the court knew, the victims lost there money at a bingo game they were invited to by the 
Defendant, or at a raffle in which the Defendant sold them tickets, both of which would 
qualify as participating in a pyramid scheme. 
The State's panacea for the error that occurred below is to suggest that since the 
Pyramid Scheme Act provides a civil remedy for a violation of the Act, the "but for" test 
is somehow automatically met or obviated. Appellee Brief, p. 14. The State's position 
seems to be that the State does not have to put anything into the record approaching 
8 
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scienter or animus, mens re or causation, representations, or reliance as would be required 
to establish civil liability, because participating in pyramid schemes are inherently 
deceptive, such that for restitution purposes, there is no requirement for a factual 
connection between the damages sought and the plea of participating in a pyramid. 
Appellee Brief, pp. 17-18. 
Although the argument is obscure, in essence the State seems to be saying that 
because pyramid schemes are "inherently deceptive" there is created some type of strict 
liability,3 such that there is no further requirement on the part of the State to show 
causation to damages, the mental intent of the participator, or what representations were 
made and to whom. The state seems to be saying that the fraud aspects required to show 
civil liability are implicit when one admits to participating in a pyramid. The problem 
with this reasoning is that it still ignores the Restitution Act requirement appearing at § 
77-38a-302 that the criminal conduct of the Defendant has resulted in pecuniary damages 
to the victim. Case law interpreting the statute prohibits the trial court from drawing any 
inferences whatsoever about the connection between the crime admitted to and the losses 
to the victim. State v. Watson, 987 P.2d 1289,1290 (Utah App. 1999). (Trail court drew 
impermissible inferences when it tried to impose restitution for burial expenses for a 
murder victim, when the plea was to obstruction of justice). State v. Larsen, 221 P.2d 
3
 Contrary to the State's suggestion that the Pyramid Act is a strict liability statute, 
there is nothing in the Act that "clearly indicates a legislative purpose" to impose strict 
liability for the crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (2003). 
9 
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277, 280 ((Utah App. 2009). (Plea to joy riding, and the admission by the defendant that 
he stole a car, did not encompass enough facts for the trial court to impose restitution for 
damage to the car). The trial court cannot simply assume from the bare act that someone 
has pled guilty to a crime, such factors as that there is a victim, that there is a causal 
connection to the victim's loss and the acts pled to, and that the civil liability elements 
relating to defrauding someone are automatically part of the plea, such that the court can 
determine civil liability as a matter of law. Here, there was a plea hearing to participating 
in a pyramid where no facts were admitted to other than that the Defendant participated in 
a pyramid, and there was a hearing related to the Defendant's ability to pay. This court 
will search the record in vain for any facts which link this defendant to the losses 
incurred. Specifically, there are not even such rudimentary admissions that a 
representation occurred, to whom it was made, that there was reliance by the victims, all 
of which would be required to establish civil liability under the Pyramid Scheme Act, or 
under common law fraud. 
Stated differently, a bald admission in a civil suit arising under the civil provisions 
of the Pyramid Scheme Act that the defendant participated in a pyramid, would not be 
nearly sufficient to establish causation, damages, or civil liability under the civil 
provisions of the Act. If liability would be wanting in a civil action arising under the Act, 
it follows that no criminal court governed by higher standards of proof would be within 
10 
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its rights to impose restitution on such a sparse record.4 There is nothing unique or 
distinctive in the Pyramid Scheme Act that differentiates it from any other crimes arising 
under the penal code, such as assault, robbery, kidnaping, murder, rape, battery, or like 
crimes. In the context of the Restitution Act, there is still a requirement for all such 
crimes that before restitution can be imposed, there has to be a showing that the losses to 
the victims arose out of the crimes, and that civil liability must be established as a matter 
of law from the facts pled to or for which the defendant is convicted. If anything, the 
Pyramid Scheme Act relating to participating as opposed to promoting, requires greater 
vigilance on the part of the trial court. It may be that all acts of promoting a pyramid 
scheme include some act of fraud, such as a representation, but it does not follow that 
merely participating in a pyramid involved actions that would meet the elements of civil 
liability. As noted in the Appellant's initial brief, such acts as engaging in a raffle, 
playing bingo, or selling Amway products might meet the technical definition of 
participating in a pyramid, but they are light years away from the elements required to 
create civil liability under the common law or under the Act. 
The State cites to the case of People ex rel. Fahner v. Walsh, 461 N.E. 2d 78 (111. 
4Utah cases require that the facts supporting the crime must be sufficiently 
developed such that they meet the elements of a cause of action for civil damages. State v. 
Houston, 9 P.3d 188, 190 (Utah App. 2000). The concept on a collateral-estoppel-type 
basis is that with the proof standard of guilt in the criminal context of beyond a 
reasonable doubt, such a heavy and clear burden necessarily meets the lesser standards of 
proof for civil liability by a preponderance of evidence. 
11 
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App. 1984) for the proposition that pyramid schemes are inherently deceptive, such that 
the there is no requirement on the part of the State to prove mental intent, causation, or 
other elements which comprise civil fraud. Appellee Brief, p. 18. However, far from 
supporting the proposition that participating in pyramids does not require a showing of 
intent, the Fahner case states that the issue of whether or not a given practice is deceptive 
must be decided upon a case-by-case basis. Id. at 79. That case intricately examined the 
details of the defendant's conduct in order to make a determination that civil liability 
would attach. Id. Thus, the Fahner case cannot be used to support a suggestion that the 
Pyramid Scheme Act is a strict liability statue, which requires no showing or intent or 
damages in order to impose civil liability. 
The State also contends at page 20 of its opposition brief that the trial court did not 
commit error when it completely omitted any findings and conclusions to support its 
restitution order. The State argues that "any error was harmless because defendants 
admissions justified restitution and additional testimony could not have altered that 
decision. " Appellee Brief, p. 20. The problem with this argument is that there literally 
were no admissions, other than to participating in a pyramid. Mr. Poulsen is of the view 
that the trial court mistakenly believed that causation had be established at the time of the 
plea hearing, when it had not been so established. This court's duty is to decide if, 
standing alone, the bare admission to a crime—especially one as metaphysical as 
participating in a pyramid—with no other facts in the record, can give rise to the 
12 
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automatic imposition of a $60,000 restitution order to the putative victims. The 
Restitution Act states that: "If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount or 
distribution of the restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the 
issue." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(3). The Act also requires findings supporting the 
order. There are none in the record except as it relates to ability to pay. Counsel's 
objections to the imposition and amount of restitution are replete through the record, 
including his repeated efforts to try and put into evidence a showing that there was no 
nexus between the defendant's actions and the loss to the defendants. Restitution Hearing, 
R. 79,p. 11: 1-22; p. 4: 1-25; p. 5 1-25; p. 6 1-19.5 
The State makes this brazen statement in footnote 2, page 23 of the opposition 
brief: "The State acknowledges that on appeal its argument justifying restitution is based 
upon additional civil grounds than those proposed or adopted below." [Emphasis added] 
The State goes on to suggest that even if the trial court did not have proper grounds for 
imposing civil restitution, on appeal, this court can still sustain a restitution order if there 
is a basis in the record. The entire point of this appeal is that there is no basis in the 
record. The State's admission that the correct legal grounds for the imposition of civil 
restitution were not followed below should give this court cause for pause in upholding a 
5
 The court will note that the counsels repeated efforts to direct the hearing to 
causation of the alleged victims loss bordered on arguing with the court about that right. 
The trial court was steadfast in stating that the restitution hearing was limited to the 
determination of the defendant's wealth. 
13 
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$60,000 judgment, which the State can enforce using incarceration as a stick. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred below in that: 1) it drew impermissible inferences about the 
crime in ordering the restitution; 2) the factual record does not support the restitution 
ordered, in that it fails to demonstrate a causal nexus between the facts pled to and the 
restitution ordered; and, 3) in ordering the restitution, the defendant was not afforded the 
rudimentary predicates of due process. Based upon the forgoing factors, the restitution 
order should be VACATED. 
DATED this day of March, 2012. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
Mark L. Poulsen 
Counsel for Appellant 
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1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
2 (May 11, 2010) . 
3 MR. MARK POULSEN: Number 37, Your Honor? 
4 THE JUDGE: Okay. 
5 MS. OfBRYANT: If I may approach, Your Honor. 
6 THE JUDGE: You may. 
7 MS. OfBRYANT: We have an amended information. 
8 Counsel has already been provided a copy. 
9 THE JUDGE: Okay. You've been given a copy of 
10 the information. Do you waive a formal reading of the 
11 charge? 
12 MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes we do, Your Honor. 
13 THE JUDGE: We're here today for an initial 
14 appearance and we'll go ahead and schedule his waiver 
15 hearing. Is that what we are here for? 
16 MR. MARK POULSEN: I think we're here to plea. 
17 MS. O1BRYANT: Enter a plea to the amended 
18 information. 
19 MR. MARK POULSEN: Enter a plea, Your Honor. 
20 THE JUDGE: Enter a plea today? Okay. Two 
21 Class B misdemeanors. I see. All right. 
22 MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes, Your Honor. W e — 
23 THE JUDGE: You've advised your client of his 
24 rights? 
25 MR. MARK POULSEN: I have. 
pnr:p A 
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THE JUDGE: And he understands the possible 
consequences of his plea, the rights that he's giving up or 
waiving, the possible sentence that could be imposed? Is 
that right, sir? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Do you understand? Have you had an 
adequate opportunity to talk to your lawyer about those 
things? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Are you prepared to waive your rights 
and enter a guilty plea to two Class B misdemeanors today? 
Is that the plea bargain or not? 
MS. 0'BRYANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: That is the plea bargain? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: May I have A factual basis to support 
the pleas? 
MS. 0'BRYANT: Yes, Your Honor. On or about 
about it looks like March 14th of 2008 and September 26th, 
2008 this individual solicited funds for a pyramid scheme, 
the total amount was a, $168,400. 
THE JUDGE: You've heard what's been stated. 
Are those the essential facts that you're admitting to to 
support the plea? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes they are, Your Honor 
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ENTRY OF PLEA 
THE JUDGE: They are. Okay. To the charges as 
contained in Count 1 and Count 2, two Class B misdemeanors, 
operating a pyramid scheme, what are your pleas? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Guilty, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: I'll receive and accept your guilty 
plea and proceed to sentencing at a time that you request. 
Do you want to be sentenced today or not? 
MS. O'BRYANT: Your Honor, I think we can do 
everything but the restitution today. We've, we've 
stipulated. We're recommending that the court order some 
community service and an appropriate fine for the Class B 
misdemeanor. And we're asking for a hearing in about 30 
days. We're going to try and come up with a stipulation as 
to the exact amount this individual is able to pay. 
THE JUDGE: How much community service are you 
recommending? 
MS. O'BRYANT: 60 hours. 
THE JUDGE: Is that, is that your understanding? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: That will work, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Anything you'd like to 
say in your own behalf, sir? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: There's something I'd like to 
say on his behalf if you don't mind. 
THE JUDGE: Go ahead. 
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MR. MARK POULSEN: This individual is an 
immigrant from Viet Nam. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MARK POULSEN: And a, he; although he's not 
illiterate he's a, very very unsophisticated. He was drawn 
into an investment scheme by his elders quorum president. 
He put all of his assets and life savings into that and a, 
lost it all. He was approached by his, two others about his 
a, his deals and told them about it and it resulted in these 
charges, Your Honor. 
He's an extremely unsophisticated person with no 
criminal background and no history whatsoever. He simply 
got caught up in an, in an investment fraud scheme that he 
was swept away in and again, lost all of his assets as a 
result of it. 
I, I would just urge the court's lenience on his 
behalf. A very, again, a very unsophisticated person for 
whom the law has just reached up and whacked in the side of 
the head. He doesn't quite understand it all but a, we'll 
accept the court's determination on it. 
THE JUDGE: Anything you'd like to say in your own 
behalf, sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: If I may. 
THE JUDGE: You may. 
* 
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STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT POULSEN 
THE DEFENDANT: For the last 18 months my life 
have been changed dramatically from this event. And I don't 
ask the court to a, to be easy on me. I believe in 
responsibility. As a father of six children I teach them to 
do what is right. And because of this unfortunate, that we 
lost everything we have and we have to start over. At the 
same time I teach my children to stand up for and be 
accountable for the mistake they make. And this unfortunate 
mistake, I went through so much persecute at work and from 
what people read in the paper and a, of all these things. 
But the positive outcome came from it, I learned so much from 
it. I became a better father, better husband. And my eyes 
have opened from this and I'm grateful for that 
opportunity. 
And what I'm only asking you as a judge is that 
my children is everything to me, and that if I can retain 
my license to continue to work and support them and raise 
them and start our life over I will greatly appreciate it. 
And I'm sorry for all of this and if you can be 
understanding. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you, sir. Anything further 
from anyone? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Nothing, Your Honor. 
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SENTENCE 
THE JUDGE: All right. It will be the judgment 
and the sentence of the court, Mr. Poulscn, that you serve 
six months in the county jail and pay $1,000 fine. I'll 
suspend the sentence this morning, place you on court 
probation for 12 months., Keep the court advised where you 
live during that time. Do not the violate the law. 
I'll order you serve 60 hours of community service 
and pay a minimum fine of $555 for both charges, that will 
include the 85% surcharge. So it will be a $300 fine and a 
255 surcharge is $555. Okay? 
Is there a court security fee on a Class B 
misdemeanor? I don't know, I don't think so. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Do I understand you it's 500 
for both charges? 
THE JUDGE: Total. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Total. 
THE JUDGE: Total. That will include both 
charges. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: One fine both Counts. 
All right. All right. Now we need a time 
certain since you're on court probation, there were no 
probation officer here, when this sentence will be 
completed. So when will he have his 60 hours completed and 
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pay the fine? You tell me and I'll more than likely go along 
with it but I expect it completed within that time period. 
Okay? 
MS. O'BRYANT: Your Honor, we still need to set 
the restitution—. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MS. O'BRYANT: — and I think it's going to 
probably take the entire 12 months to get everything taken 
care of. 
THE JUDGE: Should we just set a, do you have a 
number now? 
MS. O'BRYANT: Well, we have the total number of 
restitution. I don't think he has the ability to pay that. 
And that's what we wanted to discuss to see if we could come 
up with a stipulation as to court ordered probation. 
THE JUDGE: We'll probably put the order right 
now. What is the total number? 
MS. O'BRYANT: The total number is $168,400, o r — 
THE JUDGE: And you agreed to that, so we don't 
need a hearing on that? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: No, I don't agree that that's 
the proper amount. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: That is the amount that 
various people invested, but he didn't get that or any 
PAGE 10 
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approaching that so a — 
THE JUDGE: Well, then that's not the amount that 
he should pay if that's your position. 
MS. O'BRYANT: Right. That's, our position is 
not that that is the amount that— 
THE JUDGE: It's not a judgment— 
MS. 0'BRYANT: — he should have to pay. 
THE JUDGE: — against him so. 
MS. O'BRYANT: That's the total loss. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. O'BRYANT: What we need to discuss i s — 
THE JUDGE: How much he owes. 
MS. O'BRYANT: — what he has the ability to pay. 
I — 
THE JUDGE: Okay. We'll put it 60 days down for 
the state to submit a claim for restitution. u. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: And if it's not decided within that 
time we'll have a hearing. Okay? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Now, the 60 hours of community service 
and the fine. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Now the fine he can pay within 
a week. 
THE JUDGE: One week? Okay. 
PAGE 11 
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1 MR. MARK POULSEN: And the community service I 
2 would say 60 days. Are you okay with 60 days? 60 days, two 
3 months. 
4 THE JUDGE: That's the order then. Okay. Any 
5 questions? 
6 MR. MARK POULSEN: Thank you very much, 
7 Your Honor. 
8 THE JUDGE: Good luck. Good luck. 
9 WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(March 29, 2011) 
THE JUDGE: Which case are we ready on? 
MS. O*BRYANT: We're ready on David Poulsen, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Number 57, David Poulsen. 
We're here for a restitution hearing. 
DISCUSSION BY MS. 0'BRYANT 
MS. 0'BRYANT: Your Honor, we.have not been able 
to come to a resolution of this case. But we have agreed 
rather than have testimony to, to proffer the information to 
the court. 
The state filed a restitution request on June 15th 
of last year. It should be in the court's file. And that 
restitution request has the numbers that we would proffer to 
the court as being the full restitution that the state would 
request. Does the court have that? 
THE JUDGE: Full and complete restitution? 
Let me see if I can find that. The last pleading I have is 
January 31st. 
MS. O'BRYANT: Right. And on June, June 15th is 
when we filed our original request for restitution. 
THE JUDGE: Way back. Okay. 
MS. O'BRYANT: So it's going to be farther in the 
file. 
Dnrzr "3 
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THE JUDGE: State's request for restitution, total 
of 168,400. 82,000 to Robert Clark and 86,000 to Michael 
Keith. Correct? 
MS. O1BRYANT: That's correct, Your Honor. And 
attached to that are the supporting documents for that. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. OlBRYANT: And I believe that the defense 
would stipulate that those are the numbers that are related 
to this case. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. All right. Let's hear from 
the state, your proffer first and then to defense. Or you've 
already made your proffer s o — 
MS. 0'BRYANT: That, that would be our proffer, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: That's your.... Okay. 
Okay. Mr. Poulsen? 
ARGUMENT BY MR. POULSEN 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Your Honor, may I approach? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I think to be clear, 
Your Honor, we would stipulate that the, the dollar figures 
that you see there are amounts that victims put into this. 
I, 1 reiterate that there has to be a nexus 
between the allegations pled to, which is participating in a 
pyramid scheme, and the restitution in this case. And I 
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don't believe that that 168 represents a nexus in any way, 
shape or form to, to the injury— 
THE JUDGE: That's the argument you made to me 
that I denied though, isn't it? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I'm not sure if that's, if 
that's what the basis of your denial was, Your Honor. I'm 
not sure— 
THE JUDGE: That was the basis— 
MR. MARK POULSEN: — if that's what you said. 
THE JUDGE: — of your case though, wasn't it? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: My request was to dismiss the 
hearing. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I think the court can still 
have a hearing but still make a decision as to the 
appropriateness of the relationship between the a... 
We DON'T concede though those victims lost that at 
the hands of this person. There's no facts in the record to 
support that, Your Honor. Any facts would be hearsay to 
that effect. 
We pled very simply to participating in pyramid 
scheme. I asked the court in all earnest that the 
restitution order be tied to only those facts. Otherwise we 
wouldn't have pled to them, Your Honor. 
I would say further, had we known that we were 
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going to be facing $168,000 restitution I would rather take, 
try the case and have the offense, you know, dealt with in a 
full and fair hearing than plead to participating in a 
pyramid scheme and still face a $168,000 payback. 
THE JUDGE: Well, if he had been found guilty you 
would still be faced with the same consequence. They would 
be asking for restitution for this amount. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: They would be, and then, and 
again— 
THE JUDGE: We would be right here today whether 
you pled guilty or found guilty. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: But we'd probably only do it 
to a pyramid scheme, Your Honor. That's different than 
sticking somebody up for 168,000. They are not the same. 
And there's not A nexus between those two, it's very very 
crucial. 
These people all put their money together into a, 
pyramid scheme with, and Mr. Bosch (phonetic) who has been 
indicted by the state--
THE JUDGE: Okay. S o — 
MR. MARK POULSEN: They were all victims and lost 
on that together. 
THE JUDGE: I don't mean to cut you off. But I, I 
appreciate that argument. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Okay. 
PAGE 6 
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THE JUDGE: It's a good one and it has some 
persuasive weight to it. I just decline to adopt it and 
disagree. 
So we are here today to determine the amount, 
you've stipulated to the amount. If you have something to 
say, you'd like to present to me as to what the amount ought 
to be for the court. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes I do, Your Honor. 
The, the tax statements I have here shows that the 
victim, that the, the victim, the, the defendant in the last 
two years has had an income of $100,000, 99 and 101 I think 
s o — 
THE JUDGE: Each year? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Each year. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: That represents a, we're 
proffering, Your Honor, that represents his effort to dig 
out of the financial hole by working two jobs. He is an 
X-ray technician for Intermountain Health and a, and for 
Payson hospital. And he works two jobs. And I think it's 
between 20 and $25 an hour is what that would net out to 
as a wage. Works, you know, more than a, 70, 80 hours a 
week. 
He has six children. One is about to leave to 
college, another is about to leave on a mission, various 
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stages of high school and junior high and elementary. 
He doesn't own a house. And he owns two old 
dilapidated cars. Lives in an apartment and a, is a... 
Again, I would represent to the court that his 
expenses are approximately equivalent to his income. He 
pays tithing and his other charitable contributions. And a, 
that again he, he has a, a very little disposable income at 
the end of, of that. 
He's here in open court, Your Honor, you'd be free 
to ask him questions. This is by proffer and that's what I 
would proffer to you. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: But that a, I think that 
he could realistically do debt service a $10,000 obligation 
over a period of, you know, perhaps three years. And a, 
that that would be, that's reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
We're unable to, as the unusual circumstance of 
being a, a small Class B misdemeanor with a very large a, 
restitution amount in it, theoretically. 
But again, I would ask the court to, to not 
indenture this person for, for years of his life in paying 
back an obligation, which he's already paid, lost $300,000 
himself and a, has done everything in his power to support 
his family and dig out of the hole that he's in. 
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THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: State's response? 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MS. 0'BRYANT 
MS. O'BRYANT: If I could have just a moment to, 
to verify the accuracy. 
Your Honor, I don't know if you want this marked as 
an exhibit or if I could simply submit this as part of the 
restitution. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I have no objection. 
MS. O'BRYANT: Okay. If we could have this 
marked. This is from the bankruptcy court. Mr. Poulsen 
filed bankruptcy in 2009. It's marked as state's EXHIBIT #1 
and they have accepted the accuracy of this. 
I would call the court's attention to the average 
expenses incurred, monthly income. There's $1,000 difference 
there in the positive, which would seem to indicate that even 
after all of his monthly expenses he could afford $1,000 a 
month payments. 
THE JUDGE: This was dated when? 
MS. O'BRYANT: That's I believe January of 
2009. 
THE JUDGE: What are the circumstances now? 
MS. O'BRYANT: My understanding is the total 
income that he's making is the same or greater than it was at 
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that time. 
THE JUDGE: Do you want to respond to this? 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. POULSEN 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes. My only response, 
Your Honor, would be that the circumstances of a, of raising 
a family and paying, the children going to college and those 
circumstances have, have evaporated whatever additional 
income might be represented by that, or so-called disposable 
income. Just the needs of a growing family, Your Honor, are 
overwhelming in that sense. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So let's make sure that 
you're both a, representing to me the standard of review for 
the court here today. You both stipulate and agree that the 
real purpose of the hearing is to determine not the amount of 
restitution, that's been fixed and is full and complete at 
the 168,400. Right? But the order should be based on his 
ability to pay. Correct? 
MS. 01BRYANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Do you agree with that? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: I do agree with that. 
THE JUDGE: And what you've presented to me is 
the only evidence that 1 have before me to determine his 
ability to pay. Correct? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Yes. As well as 
appropriateness. If I could state for the record, as well 
•nAriT? i n 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 as the appropriateness of the payment in the nexus to the 
2 crime is, I believe, a proper standard for the court to 
3 follow. 
4 THE JUDGE: I'm not quite sure. You keep arguing 
5 that to me and I'm not sure I understand it. Because that 
6 was before me before and I, I think I denied that, that 
7 argument that you have made that there should be a 
8 restitution that, no restitution in this case because it's 
9 not appropriate to the crime that he committed. 
10 MR. MARK POULSEN: And the only thing again I 
11 would like to say for the record on that point, it's 
12 appropriate to have a restitution hearing where both the 
13 amount of the restitution, or both the ability to pay as 
14 well as the circumstances of the restitution are 
15 appropriate. I think that that is within the scope of a 
16 restitution hearing. 
17 THE JUDGE: Ms. Baldwin do you have, 0'Bryant, do 
18 you have anything to respond to that? 
19 MS. OfBRYANT: Your Honor, I think the court has 
20 ruled on whether restitution is appropriate in the case. 
21 It's just simply the amount that needs to be addressed here 
22 today 
23 COURT'S RULING 
24 THE JUDGE: Thank you. Okay. 
25 Well, I have considered that he's working two jobs 
DA/^TT 1 1 
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and is an X-ray technician, he makes $25 an hour. He has six 
children. He lives in an apartment. He has no home. He 
drives old cars. 
That he has had income in the past two years of 
99,000 and $100,000 each year which is substantial, income. 
I do appreciate and find that he has little disposable income 
but that there was a bankruptcy where he was verifying to the 
bankruptcy court he had $1,000 a month disposable income back 
in January of 2009. 
I appreciate that his expenses have gone up with 
college and other things towards his family. But 
restitution is an important component in this, in this case. 
And a, some of the other luxuries of, of college educations 
and things like that for his children, as important as that 
is, and I don't mean to diminish that, it seems to me to be 
a, something that he has the ability to forego, and that the 
victims in this case should be paid before that takes place. 
And there's an, obviously that seems to me to be an extra 
income for him. 
So 1 think that a restitution order in this case 
from 168 ought to be a, 60,000, 30,000 to each victim, and 
that he has the ability to pay $1,000 a month, 500 to each of 
those victims for five years until that's paid in full. 
Okay? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
PAGE 12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE JUDGE: Anything further? That's the 
parameters of what you presented to me. 
Is that right, Ms. O'Bryant? 
MS. O'BRYANT: It is correct, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Poulsen? Anything else that I'm 
missing here that that's what you wanted me to determine 
based on the law and the facts that I have before me? 
MR. MARK POULSEN: The defendant was saying he 
can't work two jobs for five more years, he just doesn't 
think he has the physical capacity for that. 
THE JUDGE: Well he's, he's got a, he's got tax 
returns and income of $100,000 a year. And so I do not see 
in any way, shape or form that I have a poverty case before 
me here. And something is going to have to change in his 
life-style to make sure that he maybe cuts back on a few 
things and that this restitution is paid. 
If his income was less than that, counsel, I'd be 
more sympathetic with your case. But that's a substantial 
income in this economy, many people are making far less than 
that. So that was the most persuasive piece of evidence in 
favor of the state in my view and justified the, especially 
in light of the fact that his bankruptcy listed he had 
$6,000 a month and $5,000 a month in expenses. 
If he has disposable income he wants to place for 
his children's college, that's great. But there are other 
r>7i r>r? 1 1 
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ways to do that, student loans, and children can work. 
These victims need to be paid. I have reduced it 
substantially from what was ordered in this case, what was 
presented to me I should say in this case, based on his 
ability today. But clearly with the facts before me today 
he has that excess income, that income to pay this amount and 
for this period of time to these victims. 
Thank you. 
MR. MARK POULSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded 
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I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify 
that I received the electronically recorded proceedings in 
the matter of State vs. Poulsen, hearing date March 29, 2011, 
and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a full, 
true and correct transcription of said hearing so recorded 
and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 
1 through 14, inclusive, including where it is indicated that 
the recording was inaudible. 
I further certify that I am not of kin nor otherwise 
associated with any of the parties to this cause of action 
and am not interested in the event thereof. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 5th day of May, 
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PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER/NOTARY 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES -1-fVp rf>,]!H-fY 
RESTITUTION H E A R M T ^'^ 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 101401180 FS 
Judge: STEVEN L. HANSEN 
Date: March 29, 2011 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DAVID Q POULSEN, 
Defendant 
PRESENT 
Clerk: taras 
Prosecutor: OBRYANT, MARIANE B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): POULSEN, MARK L 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 16, 1969 
Audio 
Tape Number: 11-2 03 Tape Count: 10:47 
CHARGES 
PYRAMID SCHEME 
Plea: Guilty 
PYRAMID SCHEME 
Plea: Guilty 
Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 05/11/2010 Guilty 
Class B Misdemeanor 
• Disposition: 05/11/2010 Guilty 
HEARING 
TAPE: 11-203 COUNT: 10:47 
This matter comes before the court for a restitution hearing. 
Mrs. O1Bryant proffers testimony. Mr. Poulsen proffers testimony. 
Mr. Poulsen stipulates to the dollar amounts the victims have 
invested. Mrs. O'Bryant responds. The court orders restitution in 
the amount of $60,000.00. 
The court orders $30,000.00 to be paid to Robert Clark and 
$30,000.00 to be paid to Michael Keith. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PYRAMID SCHEME a Class B 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PYRAMID SCHEME a Class B 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
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Case No: 101401180 Date: Mar 29, 2011 
SENTENCE 
Charge # 
FINE 
1 Fine 
Suspended 
Due 
Charge # 2 Fine 
Suspended 
Due 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$1000.00 
$1000.00 
$0.00 
$1000.00 
$1000.00 
$0.00 
$2000.00 
$2000.00 
$0 
$0 
Plus Interest 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Complete 60 hour(s) of community service. 
Restitution Amount: $30000.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: ROBERT CLARK 
Restitution 
Pay in behalf of: 
Amount: 
MICHAEL 
$30000 
KEITH 
00 
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY 
The following cases are on timepay 101401180. 
The defendant is to pay $1000.00 monthly on the 29th. 
The number of payments scheduled is 63 plus a final payment of 
$748.75. 
The first payment is due on 4/29/2011 the final payment of $748.11 
is due on 07/29/2016. The final payment may vary based on 
interest. y J !^ A 
7 
Date: 3-^q-U 
STEVEN L. HANSEN TWl- •"•• } V 
District Court Judge 
STAMPUSEDATDfRECTI 
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Utah Code 
Title 77 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 38a 
Crime Victims Restitution Act 
Section 302 
Restitution criteria. 
77-38a-302. Restitution criteria. 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct 
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For 
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) 
and in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria 
and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and 
court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for 
all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of 
sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this 
part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, 
the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall 
include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to 
which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an 
element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person 
directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, 
conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, 
the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss 
or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and 
devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and 
treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the 
place of treatment; 
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^ 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are 
lost due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by 
the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the 
offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted 
in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum, and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or 
on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution 
and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(d) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine 
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at 
the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court 
within one year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer 
an order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution. 
Amended by Chapter 96, 2005 General Session 
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Utah Code 
Title 76 
Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 2 
Principles of Criminal Responsibility 
Section 102 
Culpable mental state required -- Strict liabil.ty 
76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — Strict liability. 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, and 
when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense 
does not iilvolve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to 
establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute 
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal 
responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring 
proof of any culpable mental state. 
Amended bv ("!i;iptcr W. I tJN * (icncral Session 
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